Yapay Zeka Ve Bilinç Tartışması | Abdurrahman Bulut | TEDxTrabzon University

Quick Overview

Abdurrahman Bulut argues that the debate between Artificial Intelligence and Consciousness hinges on ontology, contrasting the reductive/functionalist view (like Dennett's, which asserts AI can achieve consciousness) with the non-reductive/dualist view (like Nagel's and Chalmers', which emphasize the irreducible nature of subjective experience, or qualia).

Key Points: The rapid advancement of AI forces a choice between two fundamental philosophical approaches to consciousness: Reductionism/Functionalism and Irreductible Dualism (08:32). Reductionists, such as Daniel Dennett, equate consciousness with functional organization, believing AI can achieve consciousness, viewing it as an engineering problem (10:33). Non-reductionists, including Thomas Nagel and David Chalmers, argue for an 'explanatory gap' because subjective experience (qualia) is irreducible to physical functions (10:42, 09:45). Nagel's famous thought experiment, 'What is it like to be a bat?', highlights the irreducible nature of subjective experience, which cannot be captured by physical descriptions alone (07:37). The speaker suggests that if an AI claims to feel pain, the dualist position implies we can never truly know if its experience mirrors ours, unlike a radio processing electromagnetic waves (08:16, 17:16). The choice of ontology—whether AI embodies physical/functionalist or dualist principles—will profoundly shape the ethical and societal future of technology (15:40). The speaker concludes by emphasizing that this choice is not just philosophical but will determine the ethical framework for humanity's future relationship with advanced AI (16:33).

Context: The TEDx talk by Abdurrahman Bulut at Trabzon University addresses the profound philosophical debate surrounding Artificial Intelligence (AI) and consciousness, specifically focusing on the concept of qualia (subjective experience). The speaker frames the discussion by contrasting major philosophical stances, referencing key thinkers like René Descartes, Hans Moravec, Ray Kurzweil, Thomas Nagel, David Chalmers, and Daniel Dennett, to illustrate the tension between physicalist explanations and the irreducible nature of subjective feeling.