# Yapay Zeka Ve Bilinç Tartışması | Abdurrahman Bulut | TEDxTrabzon University Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YcWdFEcU8g4 Recap page: https://rapidrecap.app/video/YcWdFEcU8g4 Generated: 2026-01-26T17:37:18.37+00:00 --- ## Quick Overview Abdurrahman Bulut argues that the debate between Artificial Intelligence and Consciousness hinges on ontology, contrasting the reductive/functionalist view (like Dennett's, which asserts AI can achieve consciousness) with the non-reductive/dualist view (like Nagel's and Chalmers', which emphasize the irreducible nature of subjective experience, or qualia). **Key Points:** - The rapid advancement of AI forces a choice between two fundamental philosophical approaches to consciousness: Reductionism/Functionalism and Irreductible Dualism (08:32). - Reductionists, such as Daniel Dennett, equate consciousness with functional organization, believing AI can achieve consciousness, viewing it as an engineering problem (10:33). - Non-reductionists, including Thomas Nagel and David Chalmers, argue for an 'explanatory gap' because subjective experience (qualia) is irreducible to physical functions (10:42, 09:45). - Nagel's famous thought experiment, 'What is it like to be a bat?', highlights the irreducible nature of subjective experience, which cannot be captured by physical descriptions alone (07:37). - The speaker suggests that if an AI claims to feel pain, the dualist position implies we can never truly know if its experience mirrors ours, unlike a radio processing electromagnetic waves (08:16, 17:16). - The choice of ontology—whether AI embodies physical/functionalist or dualist principles—will profoundly shape the ethical and societal future of technology (15:40). - The speaker concludes by emphasizing that this choice is not just philosophical but will determine the ethical framework for humanity's future relationship with advanced AI (16:33). ![Screenshot at 08:42: The slide contrasts the two main philosophical camps—Reductionist/Functionalist \(Dennett\) vs. Non-reductionist \(Nagel, Chalmers\)—regarding whether AI can achieve consciousness, framing this ontological choice as critical for the future.](https://ss.rapidrecap.app/screens/YcWdFEcU8g4/00-08-42.jpg) **Context:** The TEDx talk by Abdurrahman Bulut at Trabzon University addresses the profound philosophical debate surrounding Artificial Intelligence (AI) and consciousness, specifically focusing on the concept of qualia (subjective experience). The speaker frames the discussion by contrasting major philosophical stances, referencing key thinkers like René Descartes, Hans Moravec, Ray Kurzweil, Thomas Nagel, David Chalmers, and Daniel Dennett, to illustrate the tension between physicalist explanations and the irreducible nature of subjective feeling. ## Detailed Analysis The speaker, Abdurrahman Bulut, opens by noting that the rapid acceleration of AI development brings critical questions about its role and its potential consciousness. He introduces the central tension through a comparison of two fundamental philosophical approaches. The first is the Reductionist/Functionalist camp, championed by thinkers like Daniel Dennett, who define consciousness as functional organization and maintain that AI can achieve consciousness, treating it as an engineering challenge (10:33). The opposing view is Non-reductionist/Dualism, represented by Thomas Nagel, David Chalmers, and Sir John Eccles, who argue for an 'explanatory gap' (10:42). Nagel’s famous thought experiment, 'What is it like to be a bat?' (07:37), is used to illustrate that subjective experience (qualia) cannot be fully explained by physical processes alone. The speaker uses the analogy of a radio receiving waves but not subjectively experiencing them to explain the dualist critique of functionalism regarding AI (17:16). He stresses that the ontological choice made today—whether to adopt a functionalist or dualist view of being—is not merely academic but will determine the ethical and moral framework for humanity's future interaction with advanced AI (16:33, 18:58). ### AI Development and Philosophical Stances - AI advancement brings forth questions about its role and consciousness - Compares Reductionism/Functionalism (Dennett) vs. Non-reductionism/Dualism (Nagel, Chalmers) (09:04, 10:33) ### The Hard Problem of Consciousness - David Chalmers coined the term 'Hard Problem of Consciousness' (09:44) - Thomas Nagel's 'What is it like to be a bat?' highlights the subjective gap (07:37) ### Dualism vs. Materialism - Dualists (Descartes, Eccles) argue consciousness/mind is a non-physical substance interacting with the physical, stating AI consciousness is technologically impossible (12:55) - Materialists/Functionalists (Dennett) view consciousness as functional organization, solvable by engineering (10:33) ### Ontological Choice and Future Ethics - The choice between these ontologies is crucial, as it dictates the ethical and moral framework for interacting with future advanced AI systems (16:33, 18:58) ![Screenshot at 03:02: Sponsors recognized for the TEDx Trabzon University event.](https://ss.rapidrecap.app/screens/YcWdFEcU8g4/00-03-02.jpg) ![Screenshot at 06:05: The slide illustrates the philosophical concept of Qualia using an image of a red apple, referencing C.I. Lewis \(1929\).](https://ss.rapidrecap.app/screens/YcWdFEcU8g4/00-06-05.jpg) ![Screenshot at 08:42: A slide summarizing the 'Three Philosophers' and their stances on consciousness: Nagel \(Bat Question\), Chalmers \(Hard Problem\), and Dennett \(No Qualia\) \(08:42\).](https://ss.rapidrecap.app/screens/YcWdFEcU8g4/00-08-42.jpg) ![Screenshot at 10:32: Comparison slide detailing the two fundamental philosophical approaches: Reductionist/Functionalist \(Dennett\) versus Non-reductionist \(Nagel, Chalmers\) on AI consciousness \(10:33\).](https://ss.rapidrecap.app/screens/YcWdFEcU8g4/00-10-32.jpg) ![Screenshot at 18:48: The final slide asks 'What Should We Do?' emphasizing the necessity of choosing an ontology—human-centered or otherwise—to guide the future of technology \(18:49\).](https://ss.rapidrecap.app/screens/YcWdFEcU8g4/00-18-48.jpg)