# Partners In Need? Tracking Europe-Taiwan Relations Amidst Global Disruption | Hoover Institution Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zuYAPuRwRZA Recap page: https://rapidrecap.app/video/zuYAPuRwRZA Generated: 2026-03-11T07:33:25.449+00:00 --- ## Quick Overview Europe-Taiwan relations have sharply increased since 2020, shifting from marginality to greater strategic relevance, driven by incremental adjustments across the continent in response to a global "poly crisis" involving China fatigue, the COVID-19 pandemic, and Russia's invasion of Ukraine. **Key Points:** - Ties between Europe and Taiwan have seen a sharp uptick since 2020, moving from relative marginality toward greater strategic relevance, reflected in growing parliamentary engagement and expanding economic cooperation. - Mate Chimalic's research groups European countries into four categories based on engagement: 'old partners' (Germany, France, UK), 'new friends of Taiwan' (Czechia, Poland, Slovakia, Lithuania), 'pragmatists' (like Hungary), and 'laggars'. - Lithuania's decision to allow a Taiwanese representative office under the name 'Taiwanese Representative Office in Lithuania' resulted in forceful PRC retaliation, including an imposed boycott of Lithuanian products, which was later elevated to an EU-level issue. - Gabrielius Lansberg noted that the PRC blockade against Lithuania involved preventing declaration of goods in customs systems and imposing secondary sanctions, such as pressuring a German automotive company due to a Lithuanian-produced part. - The EU ultimately coordinated a response, including a G7 statement supporting Lithuania and the EU initiating a WTO case against the PRC, which helped lead to the return of trade, as China sought to prove the initial disruption was a 'glitch'. - Key drivers for increased European engagement include realizing the interconnected nature of security, soft security cooperation (economic security, supply chain resilience), and seeing Taiwan's role in supporting Ukraine. - Future sustainability requires Taiwan to deliver on economic pledges to avoid 'Taiwan fatigue,' while Europe needs to move forward on removing market access barriers and fostering dialogue with upcoming young political leaders. **Context:** This discussion, hosted by the Hoover Institution, analyzes the evolving relationship between Europe and Taiwan amidst global disruption, featuring experts Mate Chimalic, Executive Director of the Central European Institute of Asian Studies, and Gabrielius Lansberg, former Foreign Minister of Lithuania when the Taiwanese representative office opened in Vilnius. The context is set by the growing realization in Europe that engagement with Taiwan is strategically important for security and economic competitiveness, contrasting with the long-standing pressure from the PRC based on the 'One China Principle' which demands severing formal diplomatic ties with Taipei upon recognizing Beijing. ## Detailed Analysis The engagement between Europe and Taiwan has significantly intensified since 2020, evolving incrementally due to a 'poly crisis' encompassing China fatigue in Central and Eastern Europe, supply chain weaponization during COVID-19, and the shared challenge of navigating relations with the US, leading to a quantitative surge in mutual engagements from about 50 in 2019 to much higher levels subsequently. Mate Chimalic detailed a categorization of European states: 'old partners' like Germany and France, 'new friends' like Lithuania and Czechia, 'pragmatists' focused on economics (e.g., Hungary), and 'laggars' with minimal interaction, noting that this shift is driven by changing risk/benefit assessments, not a single policy turn. Lansberg detailed Lithuania's proactive stance, stemming from a desire to align with democratic partners after negative experiences with Russia and Belarus, and a geopolitical calculation regarding shifting US interests towards the Indo-Pacific; Lithuania allowed the 'Taiwanese Representative Office' to open, leading to immediate, harsh PRC economic retaliation targeting Lithuanian exports and secondary sanctions against EU companies dealing with Lithuania. The pressure on the single market, exemplified by the German auto parts incident, galvanized EU and US support, leading to the WTO case which equalized the playing field and forced Beijing to tacitly resolve the trade blockade by claiming the issue was a 'technical glitch.' Moving forward, maintaining momentum requires Taiwan to ensure economic follow-through, while Europe must navigate political headwinds, including the rise of pro-China forces and the need to establish formal party-to-party dialogue. ### Shift in Europe-Taiwan Relations - Sharp uptick in ties since 2020 - Shift from marginality to strategic relevance - Driven by incremental adjustments across the continent. ### Typology of European Engagement - Four groups identified: Old Partners (Germany, France, UK) - New Friends (Czechia, Poland, Slovakia, Lithuania) - Pragmatists (Hungary) - Laggars (no representative office opened). ### Lithuanian Case Study - Opened office using 'Taiwanese Representative Office' name, contrary to PRC demands - Faced immediate PRC boycott of exports and secondary sanctions on German firms. ### PRC Retaliation and EU Response - PRC blocked customs declarations and targeted German companies using Lithuanian parts - France, US, and G7 provided support - EU initiated WTO proceedings against PRC, which helped resolve the immediate trade crisis. ### Drivers of Increased Cooperation - Growing recognition of interconnected European/Indo-Pacific security - Soft security cooperation on economic security and supply chain resilience - Growing defense/security adjacent collaboration, e.g., drones and energy security. ### Future Considerations - Need to avoid 'Taiwan fatigue' by delivering on economic pledges - Importance of political signaling and investing in upcoming young political leaders - Slow progress on removing market access barriers, evidenced by EU initiating WTO proceedings against Taiwan on wind energy.