# (Another) U.S. Shipbuilding Disaster - The Constellation Class & U.S. Fleet Modernisation Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r7aWmtOhMjo Recap page: https://rapidrecap.app/video/r7aWmtOhMjo Generated: 2025-12-07T14:35:34.323+00:00 --- ## Quick Overview The U.S. Navy cancelled the Constellation class frigate program, reducing the order to only the two ships already under construction, because the program severely deviated from its base design, suffered cost blowouts, and mounted delays, ultimately failing to reverse the trend of expensive, under-delivered combat ship programs like the Zumwalt and LCS classes. **Key Points:** - The US Navy announced the cancellation of all but two Constellation class frigates in November, due to cost blowouts and delays after the design morphed significantly from the base model. - The Constellation program intended to use a proven international frigate design (the FREMM) to achieve affordability and high numbers, aiming for 85% commonality which reportedly dropped to about 15%. - The initial plan for the Constellation class required integrating US systems and requirements, leading to extensive redesigns, including lengthening the hull by nearly 24 ft and increasing displacement by over 700 metric tons (a roughly 13% increase). - Construction of the first ship began in August 2022 even though the functional design was only 88% complete and the design was not stable, leading to further issues like cost increases and delivery slips from 2026 to at least 2029. - Metrics used to track design progress were flawed, as the Navy counted submitted contract deliverables (CDRLs) as 50-75% complete upon submission without quality review, artificially inflating the appearance of design stability. - The program's failure mirrors prior modernization efforts like the Zumwalt class, which resulted in only three ships for over $22 billion, and the LCS program, which also saw significant cuts due to performance shortfalls. **Context:** The video analyzes the US Navy's ongoing struggles with modernizing its surface combatant fleet, contrasting the current situation with the massive, technologically diverse force the Navy maintained at the end of the Cold War, peaking at 592 active battle force ships in 1989. Following the Soviet collapse, the Navy faced the difficult task of replacing aging Cold War-era hulls—many lacking modern systems like Aegis and VLS—with new designs under shrinking budgets, leading to a series of ambitious but ultimately flawed replacement programs. ## Detailed Analysis Naval strategy demands long-term persistence because warships take decades to produce, punishing procrastination, unlike ground forces which can mobilize combat power more quickly. The US Navy's post-Cold War modernization plan aimed to transition from legacy ships (like carriers from the 1940s and cruisers from the 1960s) to modern Aegis/VLS-equipped platforms like the Arleigh Burke destroyer, while simultaneously pursuing next-generation designs to fill capability gaps. The effort to replace the non-VLS frigates and secure naval gunfire support resulted in the Zumwalt class and the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), both of which were developmental train wrecks: the Zumwalt became too expensive with too few units built, and the LCS suffered from speed requirements that sacrificed payload and survivability, leading to massive cuts for both programs. The Constellation class frigate (FFG-62) was designed as the successor to the LCS and a smaller combatant, deliberately employing a parent design approach using the successful European FREMM frigate to mitigate risk, mandate proven subsystems like Aegis and the Mk 41 VLS, and keep shipyards active. However, adapting the FREMM to stringent US requirements—such as meeting carrier speed requirements and integrating US systems—necessitated extensive modification, eroding the intended 85% commonality down to approximately 15%, which drove up costs and delayed the design. Compounding the issue, construction started in August 2022 before the functional design was stable (only 88% complete, later rising to 92% 16 months later), an early start that introduced risk without accelerating construction speed, as the first ship was only 10% complete by early 2025. Ultimately, the program was cut down to just the two ships already in construction because the continuous design alterations and delays made it too costly and complex, leaving the US Navy yet again reliant on building more Arleigh Burke-class destroyers while still lacking a true next-generation large surface combatant (DDGX) and a viable small surface combatant. ### Cold War Fleet Context - The US peaked at 592 active battle force ships in 1989, comprising chronologically diverse vessels like Iowa battleships and Midway carriers, many of which required modernization to utilize new tech like VLS. ### Technological Leap - The transition to the Aegis combat system and Mark 41 Vertical Launch System (VLS) marked a major advance over older armed-based systems, allowing for faster missile salvos and mission flexibility, exemplified by the Ticonderoga cruisers and Arleigh Burke destroyers. ### Failed Modernization Attempts - The pursuit of next-generation capabilities led to the Zumwalt class, which failed in its naval gunfire support role after becoming too expensive, and the LCS program, which struggled with mission modules and survivability, resulting in significant acquisition cuts for both. ### Constellation Class Rationale - Intended to be a safe successor to the LCS, the Constellation program adopted a parent design approach using the FREMM frigate to leverage proven technology and reduce risk for a more capable small surface combatant. ### Design Deviation and Failure - Despite starting with a proven European design, extensive modification to meet US requirements drastically reduced commonality from a hoped-for 85% to around 15%, leading to cost growth and delays. ### Acquisition Mismanagement - Construction began in August 2022 before the functional design was stable (only 88% complete), and progress metrics were skewed, crediting contractors with 50-75% completion just for submitting incomplete deliverables. ### Program Outcome - The US Navy cancelled the Constellation class, halting production after the first two ships, citing a strategic shift away from the program due to the extensive redesigns and mounting issues.