# The Truth About Hamas, October 7th & Israel's Ongoing Genocide | Ash Sarkar Meets Tareq Baconi Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_GyAXRWqa-M Recap page: https://rapidrecap.app/video/_GyAXRWqa-M Generated: 2025-12-14T17:01:17.428+00:00 --- ## Quick Overview Tareq Baconi argues that Hamas's strategic reasoning, particularly post-Great March of Return, solidified the belief that engagement with Israel only yields results through force, as unarmed resistance and negotiations failed to alleviate the Gaza blockade, leading to the October 7th operation being a calculated move within a context of ongoing conflict management rather than simple irrational brutality. **Key Points:** - Hamas's strategic calculation concluded that engagement with Israel requires force because unarmed resistance and negotiations failed to alleviate the blockade, stating, "there's no way to engage with Israel that isn't through force." - Hamas originated from the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine, which focused on 'Islamization' and social welfare for four decades before Hamas formed in 1987, contrasting with the PLO's shift towards recognizing Israel. - Israel historically benefited from Hamas's existence through 'divide and rule tactics' against secular forces and later used Hamas as a 'perfect fig leaf' to retroactively justify the Gaza blockade. - Hamas's military strategy evolved, incorporating suicide bombings after its exiled leadership made ties with Hezbollah in South Lebanon, a tactic that required specific capabilities for mobility that other methods lacked. - The 'Balance of Terror' doctrine during the Second Intifada aimed for retaliation: "for every civilian that is killed by Israelis we are going to to kill Israeli civilians," intending to compel Israeli society to pressure its leadership. - Hamas entered the 2006 elections not to legitimate Oslo, but to revolutionize the political system as a party committed to resistance, leveraging Fatah's perceived corruption and disconnection from the street. - The Great March of Return (2018) was an organic, non-Hamas-led mobilization demanding return; Hamas ultimately engaged with rocket fire only after Palestinians were being killed with little international coverage, a moment Baconi views as a precursor to 2023. **Context:** This interview between Ash Sarkar and Tareq Baconi focuses on analyzing the political and military evolution of Hamas, specifically examining Baconi's books, "Hamas Contained" (analyzing 2007-2017) and his memoir "Fire in Every Direction." The discussion centers on understanding Hamas's strategic reasoning behind its actions, including its transition from a welfare movement to a governing and armed resistance body, contrasting its trajectory with that of the PLO, and contextualizing the October 7th attack within years of failed negotiations and ongoing conflict under the Gaza blockade. ## Detailed Analysis Tareq Baconi provides a deep analysis of Hamas, tracing its roots to the Muslim Brotherhood's social work in Palestine before 1987, noting that Hamas's formation coincided with the PLO abandoning its fixed principles for negotiations. Baconi details how Hamas’s military strategy shifted, adopting suicide bombing tactics after contact with Hezbollah during its exile. He explains that the 'Balance of Terror' doctrine during the Second Intifada was a strategic attempt to force Israeli accountability for civilian deaths, an effort that backfired as it led to the election of a hawk like Ariel Sharon, who viewed the conflict purely militarily, decontextualizing Palestinian resistance as 'their domestic al-Qaeda.' Upon winning elections in 2006, Hamas aimed to revolutionize the PA into a 'society of resistance,' breaking free from the Oslo-designed economy subservient to Israel, focusing on steadfastness and resilience; however, their governance was immediately hampered by international isolation and civil strife, leading to the sealing of the Gaza blockade in 2007. Baconi describes the subsequent period (2007-2021) as a 'violent equilibrium' where Hamas used rocket fire to nudge Israel into alleviating the stifling blockade after ceasefires, noting that unarmed resistance like the Great March of Return also failed without the threat of force. Ultimately, Baconi suggests that Hamas's decision for the October 7th operation stemmed from the realization that unarmed mobilization and negotiations consistently failed to compel Israel to change its management of the conflict, viewing force as the only remaining mechanism for engagement. ### Hamas Origins and Political Shift - Founded in 1987 from the Muslim Brotherhood focused on 'Islamization' - Muslim Brotherhood initially avoided resistance, leading to tension with nationalist groups like Fatah - Islamic Jihad emerged earlier, arguing for 'liberation then Islamization,' reversing the Brotherhood's priority. ### Israeli Management and Divide and Rule - Israel benefited from Hamas existing to prevent a cohesive Palestinian political body and later used Hamas as a 'fig leaf' to justify the Gaza blockade which preceded Hamas governance. - Israeli occupation forces sometimes encouraged clashes between Muslim Brotherhood and resistance groups as part of a colonial 'divide and rule tactic.' ### Evolution of Military Strategy - Early tactics involved abducting and killing occupation forces, considered 'basic and ill-informed' relative to later tactics. - Exile in South Lebanon led to ties with Hezbollah and the adoption of suicide bombing tactics, seen as militarily more feasible than car bombs in certain zones. ### The Second Intifada and Balance of Terror - The collapse of Oslo hopes spurred mass uprising, quickly militarized by disproportionate Israeli firepower. - Hamas's 'balance of terror' doctrine retaliated for every Palestinian civilian killed by Israel, aiming to make Israeli citizens feel the terror created in Palestinian communities. ### Entry into Politics (2006 Election) - Hamas boycotted the 1996 PA elections, strengthening its legitimacy as opposition to the 'capitulation' of Oslo. - Hamas ran in 2006 to 'revolutionize' the decimated political system, campaigning against Fatah's corruption and the false promise of negotiations. ### Governance Under Blockade (Post-2007) - Hamas immediately faced international isolation and a potential coup attempt by Fatah, forcing it to learn governance while under siege. - The blockade was designed to keep Gaza 'just above the brink of collapse,' controlling food and permits to prevent both humanitarian disaster and thriving resilience. ### The Great March of Return as Precursor - This 2018 mobilization was organic and unarmed, demanding return by approaching the security fence. - Hamas escalated its involvement with rocket fire only after Palestinians were being killed by Israeli snipers with minimal international coverage, confirming the need for force.