# Dezinformacja międzynarodowa: lokalne rozwiązania | Piotr Sosnowski | TEDxUniversityofWarsaw

Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JHNEwPj2iGU
Recap page: https://rapidrecap.app/video/JHNEwPj2iGU
Generated: 2025-12-03T18:34:56.451+00:00

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## Quick Overview

The core defense against international disinformation involves creating societal resilience through a multi-layered approach, culminating in individual awareness and action, exemplified by the Polish 'Council of Resilience' model which integrates civil society, business, and academia to provide recommendations to the government.

**Key Points:**
- The European External Action Service identified over 500 incidents of foreign information sphere interference in 2024, utilizing over 38,000 fake social media accounts across 24 platforms and 90 countries.
- The disinformation ecosystem, actively driven by Russia and China, propagates narratives by moving information from hidden channels (fake accounts) through linked news portals, then to government-affiliated media, and finally through official state channels.
- Imperva reported that over 51% of internet traffic is automated, with 37% being hostile activity, though this data excludes social media platforms which remain highly non-transparent regarding user verification and algorithmic function.
- A specific disinformation tactic involved a fake story about the Ukrainian President buying a villa, which was laundered from an anonymous YouTube channel through a fake British portal before being amplified by Russian state media.
- The negative consequences of disinformation include a decline in trust in public institutions and science, and it fundamentally threatens freedom of speech because users do not know the origin or reason why content trends.
- Poland implemented the 'Council of Resilience' model, developed by Professor Kupiecki and Tomasz Chłoń, which is a recommendation body gathering third sector, business, civil society, and academics to advise the government on combating disinformation.
- The fundamental element in counteracting threats is the individual, who must adopt a strategy of awareness, react appropriately by challenging suspicious sources, and crucially, refrain from sharing unverified content.

**Context:** Piotr Sosnowski discusses the pervasive and often invisible threat of international disinformation, defining it primarily as foreign interference within the information space, which affects everyone, not just social media users, as messages can spread via friends or SMS. He outlines the sophisticated, multi-stage mechanisms used by state actors like Russia and China to inject and legitimize false narratives into the public discourse, highlighting the global scale of this challenge quantified by recent monitoring reports.

## Detailed Analysis

The discussion centers on foreign interference in information spaces, labeling it an invisible weapon where every individual is a potential victim, whether through direct exposure or via trusted contacts. Researchers have quantified this threat, noting over 500 incidents of foreign interference in 2024 involving tens of thousands of fake accounts across numerous platforms and countries, with Russia and China being the most active perpetrators. These actors employ specialized ecosystems where disinformation moves from covert sources (fake accounts, portals) through progressively more legitimate channels, sometimes culminating in official state endorsement, as demonstrated by the example of a fabricated story about the Ukrainian President being pushed through a Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs channel citing non-existent British media reports. The internet infrastructure itself complicates defense; Imperva data shows a majority of traffic is automated, and social media platforms are largely opaque regarding verification and recommendation algorithms, which are designed purely to provoke emotional reactions, a feature adversaries exploit. The resulting costs include eroded trust in institutions and science, and the undermining of free debate when content origin is obscured. To combat this, Poland established the 'Council of Resilience' at the University of Warsaw, a multi-sectoral body offering government recommendations, a model now proliferating internationally, including plans for a European Centre for Democratic Resilience. Ultimately, the speaker stresses that societal resilience starts with the individual: being aware of attack mechanisms, reacting responsibly by challenging sources, and refusing to share content if in doubt. Further engagement is possible through open cooperation models like the Open CI analytical platform and the DISARM taxonomy.

### Nature of the Threat

- Invisible weapon impacting everyone
- Global scale evidenced by 500+ incidents in 2024
- Threat vectors include friends, SMS, and social media
- Deep fakes represent a key synthetic method of implementation

### Disinformation Ecosystem Mechanics

- Ecosystems actively driven by Russia and China
- Information moves from hidden channels to linked portals
- Narratives are 'washed' through associated news sites before reaching government media
- Official state channels then repeat the narrative citing false origins

### Internet Transparency and Automation

- Over 51% of internet traffic is automated systems
- 37% of global traffic is hostile, excluding social media data
- Social media platforms are highly non-transparent regarding verification and algorithms

### Impact on Society

- Results include a devastating drop in trust in public institutions and science
- It threatens freedom of speech because the origin and trend drivers of content remain unknown
- Algorithms trap users in emotional filter bubbles

### Local and National Solutions

- Poland established the 'Council of Resilience' model, involving civil society, business, and academia
- This body acts as a recommendation engine for the government against disinformation
- The model's pilot began this year at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

### International Response and Future Steps

- International coordination is increasing in NATO, G7, and the EU
- The planned European Centre for Democratic Resilience will operate similarly to the Polish Council
- Open cooperation models like Open CI and DISARM offer deeper civil society engagement